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The Proposed Common European Sales Law (CESL) 
Introduction: an optional instrument 
On 11 October 2011 the European Commission published its Proposal for a Regulation on a 
Common European Sales Law (Brussels, 11.10.2011, COM(2011) 635 final).  The proposal 
is innovative in many ways.  It takes the form of an ‘optional instrument’, meaning that it is a 
set of rules applying to sale of goods and supply of digital content contracts that the parties 
can choose to govern their particular transaction.  At one level, there is nothing unusual about 
this: contracting parties are generally free to choose the law that will govern their contract, 
and they can if they wish choose the law of a jurisdiction with which they have no other 
connection and in which no aspect of the contract will be performed.  If the parties make no 
explicit choice, then normally the rules of international private law will determine which law 
applies; and in the European Union those rules are now to be found in the Regulation (EC) 
No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), OJ 4.7.2008, L 177/6.  What the CESL 
provides is a choice additional to those that already exist amongst the world’s laws.  But this 
alternative has a rather different character.  As a Regulation the proposed CESL will be 
directly applicable in Member States and becomes part of their domestic laws, operating 
alongside those laws insofar as it does not supplant them.  If it comes into effect, therefore, it 
will do so as part of French, German, English or Scots law as the case may be.  In a contract 
to which one of these laws would be applicable in the ordinary way, choosing the CESL as 
the governing law would not be to select a foreign law, but simply an alternative in the 
domestic one already applying.  This, as we shall see in more detail later, has crucial effects 
for consumer sales in particular.  Above all, it means that the consumer protection regime 
applying in such sales is that provided by the CESL, rather than that established by purely 
domestic legislation.   
 
Scope 
The choice of the CESL is also restricted by the scope of the instrument itself.  First, it limits 
the class of transactions for which it is available to cross-border contracts in which at least 
one of the countries involved is a Member State of the European Union.  A transaction is 
cross-border when the parties are located in different countries at the time of contracting, but 
not if the parties are merely of different nationalities.  So, for example, a shop in Edinburgh’s 
Royal Mile may target tourists from the Continent by offering only foreign language guides 
and newspapers for sale, using these languages rather than English (or Scots) as appropriate 
in dealing with individual customers, and giving prices in euros rather than pounds; but any 
contract of sale resulting from all this will still be a domestic one for Scots law or some 
choice of law other than the CESL.  Similarly for a Frenchman who, as still commonly 
happens, travels to Scotland in the summer to sell his onions or cheeses door-to-door or at a 
farmers’ market there.  The likeliest scenario for a consumer transaction to be governable by 
the CESL is therefore one of distance selling, most probably by way of electronic commerce 
on the Internet.  But if a Scotswoman orders goods from an Internet trader based in England, 
the transaction is not cross-border for CESL purposes, since all the relevant actions take place 
inside one Member State.  On the other hand, an Internet trader based in the United States 
targeting the European market with its website can do so under the CESL banner.  
The next limitation of the CESL’s scope is that the seller must be a trader; if the buyer 
is also a trader, one or other of the parties must be a small or medium-sized enterprise (SME).  
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Hence the CESL may be deployed in business-to-business (B2B) or business-to-consumer 
(B2C) sales; but it may not be used when neither party is a trader.  Finally, while the CESL 
applies to sales of goods and service contracts related to these transactions, what the 
instrument calls ‘mixed-purpose’ contracts (i.e. that include any element beyond sale of 
goods or services related to either the sale or the supply) are excluded from its scope.   
Some of these restrictions are, however, in their turn subject to choices that can be 
made by Member States.  They can decide to have no requirement that at least one party is an 
SME in a B2B transaction governed by the CESL.  They may also choose to make the CESL 
available for entirely domestic transactions without any cross-border element, which would 
not only enable the Royal Mile tourist shop to add further attractions for customers, or the 
French onion and cheese seller to tour Scotland contracting under what will be a law possibly 
more familiar at least to him, but also let the English Internet trader transact with all his 
fellow Britons, north and south of the Tweed-Solway border.     
CESL and CISG 
All this helps to differentiate the proposed CESL from the existing Vienna Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods (CISG), which is yet to be ratified by the UK but otherwise 
applies very widely in the European Union and, indeed, around the world.  While it too 
applies to cross-border sales of goods, and may also be made applicable to domestic 
transactions by its Member States, the CISG is confined to B2B transactions, without, 
moreover, any requirement that one of the businesses be an SME.  The CISG is thus wider in 
scope than the CESL in this regard; but on the other hand it has no application in B2C 
transactions.  Again, a CISG Member State will have the Convention as its applicable law for 
cross-border B2B transactions, and does not have any option to provide a parallel system of 
its own devising.  But where the proposed CESL is an ‘opt-in’ for the parties to a contract, 
the CISG allows parties in jurisdictions where it is the applicable law to ‘opt-out’, in whole or 
in part, and choose another law.  In this rather different way, then, the CISG too is an optional 
instrument.  The alternative to it could be the domestic sales law of the Member State with 
which the contract otherwise has its closest connections, or the law of some non-CISG 
jurisdiction, such as England.  Opting out of the CISG is common in commercial practice 
across Europe, raising the question of whether business parties in Europe and their advisers 
are any more likely to ‘opt in’ to the proposed CESL.   
 The CISG is however by no means a dead letter, and the evidence about its use does 
not preclude the possibility that, over time, the CESL might also gain a degree of business 
credibility.  Two aspects of the proposal may be helpful in this regard.  One is that as part of a 
European Union Regulation, the CESL unlike the CISG will have a court – the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) – in which issues about its interpretation can be 
authoritatively determined for all the jurisdictions in which it can be applied.  The other 
potentially useful aspect is the slightly wider coverage of the CESL by comparison with the 
CISG.  The latter does not cover ‘the validity of the contract or of any of its provisions or of 
any usage’ (Article 4(a) CISG).  But in the proposed CESL, validity is the subject of a whole 
chapter (5), while two further chapters (7 and 8) provide rules on, respectively, the contents 
and effects of contracts and unfair contract terms (including in the latter rules on unfair terms 
in B2B contracts).  There is very little overlap here with anything in the CISG.  The proposed 
CESL also in effect elaborates upon some of the CISG rules: for example, with regard to 
some of the remedies for non-performance such as specific performance and the seller’s right 
to cure.  On the other hand, the proposed CESL does not any more than the CISG have rules 
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on the transfer of ownership from seller to buyer, which might be thought a surprising 
omission of one of the defining characteristics of a sale.   
A business perspective on the CESL?  
A businessman may think that some of the proposed CESL is too open-textured and 
uncertain, making litigation, possibly prolonged if it has to go all the way to the CJEU, the 
only possible way of resolving disputes on legal (as distinct from factual) issues.  In general, 
litigation is an outcome devoutly to be avoided in the business world, reinforced in the case 
of the CESL if the text is seen, as it could be, as leaning too far towards enabling judicial 
intervention to go so far as to set aside what the parties have agreed.  So, for example, Article 
2 CESL affirms that each party has an un-excludable duty to act in accordance with good 
faith and fair dealing, breach of which not only may preclude a party from exercising or 
relying on a right, remedy or defence it would otherwise have, but also make that party liable 
for any loss caused by the breach of duty to the other party.  Good faith and fair dealing pop 
up across the CESL provisions, and not only in connection with consumer protection: for 
example, in the duty in business-to-business (B2B) transactions of pre-contractual disclosure 
of information about the main characteristics of the goods to be supplied (Article 23 CESL); 
in what is to be regarded as a relevant matter in interpreting any contract (Article 59 CESL); 
in the implication of terms (Article 68 CESL); and in the regulation of unfair terms in B2B 
contracts (Article 86 CESL).   
 A contract may also be avoided by a party who made a mistake of fact or law existing 
at the time of formation and who would not have entered the contract, or would have done so 
only on fundamentally different terms if the other party knew this and knew or could be 
expected to have known of the mistake but who failed to point out the relevant information 
where good faith and fair dealing would have required a party aware of the mistake to point it 
out (Article 48 CESL).  Although the same Article goes on to qualify this very widely stated 
requirement to look after the other party’s interests during the negotiation process by saying 
that there is to be no avoidance if the mistaken party assumed the risk of mistake or should in 
the circumstances bear that risk, the issues raised are of a type that could probably only be 
resolved by going to court.  Again, Article 89 CESL, requiring parties to re-negotiate their 
contract ‘where performance becomes excessively onerous because of an exceptional change 
of circumstances’ and enabling them to ask a court to adapt or terminate the contract should 
such negotiations fail, may also be seen from a business perspective as potentially 
undermining certainty in enabling any party thinking it has a losing bargain to escape the 
contract or have it adjusted to be more favourable.  It is left unclear how the duty to re-
negotiate might be enforced.  Once more the spectre of ending up in court looms large over 
all aspects of the Article 
 Some of this at least can be avoided by using the freedom of contract proclaimed in 
the very first Article of the proposed CESL, which also allows parties to ‘exclude the 
application of any of the provisions of the [CESL], or derogate from or vary their effects’.  So 
it might be possible, for example, to exclude Article 89 CESL, or to provide explicitly that a 
party assumes the risk of a mistake so that there is no question of avoidance if a mistake is 
actually made.  But there are limits to this.  Article 1 CESL says that exclusion or variation of 
the provisions of the CESL is not allowed where the provisions themselves so state; as for 
example with the non-excludable duty of good faith in Article 2 CESL.  Most of the other 
mandatory provisions in the proposed CESL are in fact in favour of consumers, and the B2B 
transaction is little affected by them.  But the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a 
potentially far-reaching one; and one also wonders why business parties would choose to 
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have their contract governed by the CESL if they wanted also to exclude, vary or derogate 
from very many of its other provisions. 
 Overall, as the Law Commissions pointed out in their Joint Advice to the United 
Kingdom Government on the CESL proposal (published only online at  
http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/news/advice-on-european-sales-law/ or 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/lawcommission/publications/1698.htm, 10 November 2011)), the 
most likely B2B setting in which the proposed CESL could prove attractive is where SMEs 
are dealing with each other.  Such businesses lack the resources to negotiate the detailed 
contracts professionally drafted for each transaction that are characteristic of bigger 
businesses, and tend to rely instead on either pre-prepared standard forms or the default rules 
of whatever may be the governing law.  If however standard forms are used on each side, 
there is the hazard of the ‘battle of the forms’, or the possibility that the other side’s form 
somehow comes to be the basis of the contract; if there is reliance on the governing law, it is 
crucial to have confidence about what that law is as well as its content.  The proposed CESL 
contains a solution to the ‘battle of the forms’ as well as regulating B2B standard form terms 
‘of such a nature that [their] use deviates from good commercial practice, contrary to good 
faith and fair dealing’ (Articles 39 and 86 CESL).  On parties’ confidence about the 
governing law, the Law Commissions referred to a case brought to their attention in which 
the conclusion of an otherwise straightforward negotiation for a contract between a Scottish 
and a Polish company was held up for weeks as the parties debated what the governing law 
should be.  The parties knew nothing of each other’s law, neither of which was accessible in 
any language that they knew well enough.  Had the proposed CESL been in force, of course, 
it would have been available in all the languages of the European Union and, provided the 
parties were happy with what they read there, their problem could have been resolved without 
much delay and the consequent expenses.   
CESL and consumer sales 
In consumer (B2C) transactions, freedom of contract is constrained, not only by the 
mandatory CESL provisions on consumer protection, but also by a provision in the 
Regulation that ‘in relations between a trader and a consumer the Common European Sales 
Law may not be chosen partially, but only in its entirety’ (Article 8(3) CESL).  What this 
seems to prevent, however, is not the exercise of the freedom provided within the proposed 
CESL itself, to vary or replace the rules in particular Articles with other rules, but the 
alternative possibility, known as depeçage in the world of international private law, of 
changing non-mandatory CESL rules by a choice of some other system’s parallel but 
different rules.  In the consumer context, in other words, the contract is to be governed by the 
CESL and those rules which the parties formulate for themselves when they are free to do so, 
rather than by a mixture of bits of the CESL and reference to bits of other laws.  But the 
argument from the silence of the Regulation on this possibility in the B2B context seems to 
leave it open to business parties as between themselves.   
Article 11 of the CESL Regulation provides that ‘where the parties have validly 
agreed to use the [CESL] for a contract, only the [CESL] shall govern the matters addressed 
in its rules’.  This has the vital effect that only the CESL’s mandatory consumer protection 
provisions apply, while those parallel rules which might be found in the consumer’s normal 
domestic law do not.  This will not matter if the CESL rules afford the same or a higher 
protection compared with those of the consumer’s normal domestic law, but it will be very 
important if the latter is in fact better.  Then the effect of a choice of the CESL will strip from 
the cross-border consumer the benefits of the Rome I Regulation which says, simply put, that 
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a choice of law other than such a consumer should normally enjoy does not deprive that party 
of mandatory domestic consumer protection.  For this reason above all, consumer groups in 
Europe are largely hostile to the CESL proposal.  Even although as first published the 
proposal incorporates all the major relevant European Union consumer protection measures, 
there is a perhaps not wholly rational fear that this may be whittled down in the negotiating 
process before the CESL text is finalised; or, more intelligibly, that once the CESL is enacted 
Member States may either cut down their existing higher consumer protection levels or avoid 
any further measures of expansion in order to enable their domestic law to compete more 
effectively with the alternative for the hearts, minds and business dealings of suppliers.  In 
other words, consumer protection in Europe could either become frozen at its present levels 
or begin to wither in a possible ‘race to the bottom’.  
Another key point here is that the choice of whether or not to use the CESL in 
consumer transactions will be primarily that of the supplier, not the consumer.  It is unlikely 
in the extreme that a consumer wishing to buy under the CESL from a seller who does not 
will be able to make the latter agree to that choice.  The most probable scenario is that a 
trader seeking to attract cross-border custom will do so by way of the Internet, declaring a 
choice of the CESL in advance – for example, by a notice or appropriate symbol on its 
website - and thereafter by trading under no other law unless dealing domestically.  So the 
consumer will be in a ‘take it or leave it’ position with regard to the CESL, protected only by 
the Regulation’s requirement that the choice must be notified by the trader to the consumer in 
advance of any contract by means of a Standard Information Notice and then, further, agreed 
by the parties separately from the contract of sale, with the trader supplying the consumer 
with a confirmation of that agreement on a durable medium.  But consumers who want the 
trader’s goods because this is the only source for them in the European Union, or because the 
price is likewise the best available, will effectively have no choice but to give up whatever 
advantages may be afforded them by their normally applicable domestic law. 
The argument for Internet traders, on the other hand, is that the Rome I defence of a 
consumer’s domestic protections inhibits them from offering their goods (and services) 
across the European Union as long as these protections remain variable around the 
multiplicity of jurisdictions and Member States.  A particular cause of concern is information 
duties, the cost of meeting which in terms of the languages needing to be used as well as the 
variability of the requirements themselves is said to be prohibitively high.  It is certainly a 
common experience to find it impossible to transact with an Internet trader located in another 
Member State because, quite apart from possible language, payment and delivery difficulties, 
its website will decline business from outside that country.  Even a worldwide giant of an 
Internet business, such as Amazon, divides its websites along national lines in the European 
Union, with different sites for the United Kingdom (amazon.co.uk), France (amazon.fr), 
Germany (amazon.de), Italy (amazon.it) and the Netherlands (amazon.nl), for example.  In all 
these jurisdictions, it may be noted, Amazon currently trades under the law of Luxembourg; 
but in each of them Rome I ensures that nonetheless the Amazon customers at whom these 
sites are directed retain the benefit of the relevant local consumer protection laws.   
A further point which might be made is that not all domestic consumer protection law 
will be displaced by the CESL, only that which applies directly in relation to the sale of 
goods.  Thus, for example, there is no question in the United Kingdom of the consumer 
losing the protection provided by connected lender liability under section 75 of the Consumer 
Credit Act 1974.  There is no direct equivalent to this elsewhere in the European Union, 
which does not require Member States to go so far.  Its existence may at least partly explain 
the apparent relative confidence of British consumers in using their credit cards to pay for 
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Internet purchases (higher than elsewhere in Europe), because they know they can make the 
credit card supplier liable if the goods or services are faulty, even if the goods are purchased 
outside the United Kingdom (see Office of Fair Trading v Lloyds TSB Bank [2007] UKHL 
48, [2008] 1 AC 316).  Its continued operation would therefore probably be extremely 
important to the electronic marketplace and so to the use of the CESL to govern sale of goods 
transactions with payment, as will be the norm, by credit card.  There may well be a further 
argument that the European Union could facilitate electronic commerce by making connected 
lender liability a Union-wide form of consumer protection.  
 What are the prospects for the proposed CESL?  The proposal was published at an 
unpropitious moment for the European ideal as Member States struggled desperately to 
prevent the collapse of one of its vital symbols, the common currency.  The chances of the 
CESL’s making its way successfully through even the qualified majority voting process was 
no more clear at the time of writing (February 2012) than those of the Herculean labours to 
save the euro.  The European Commission associated the proposal with the slogan ‘Justice for 
Growth’, arguing that in particular it would free up a hitherto latent online market worth an 
extra 26 billion euros to the European economy.  The proposal survived a rather absurd 
challenge to its compliance with the subsidiarity principle of the European Union (under 
which the Union will only act in areas beyond its exclusive competence if objectives cannot 
be achieved by the Member States themselves).  It had received support, not only from the 
European Parliament, but also from representatives of Internet traders and SMEs, including 
those in the UK.  Some of the pre-conditions for a successful outcome to the reform process 
are thus in place.  On the other hand there is significant opposition from consumer and legal 
professional groups, and it is highly uncertain whether enough Member States can be 
persuaded to vote for what some undoubtedly see as a challenge to domestic law, even if the 
latter is neither harmonised nor displaced.   
As already noted, the UK Government asked the English and the Scottish Law 
Commissions to advise it on the subject.  That advice accepted the view that the European 
single market was indeed potentially divided in the online consumer context, and that a 
common European sales law might help overcome that, but was critical of aspects of the 
CESL proposal as a means of tackling the difficulties.  Were the proposal to be focused more 
clearly or exclusively on the problems of Internet trading its chances of success might be 
improved.  The Commissions were also doubtful about whether as it stood the proposal 
sufficiently met the needs of SMEs in contracting across borders.  On the other hand, the 
Commissions argued, if the CESL, or some revised version of it, was adopted, the United 
Kingdom should use the option of making it available for domestic as well as cross-border 
online consumer transactions, since Internet traders would find problematic the need to trade 
under different laws according to where the consumer came from.  Likewise, if the CESL 
were to be adopted for B2B transactions, the United Kingdom should make it available in the 
purely domestic marketplace and not exclude non-SMEs from using it.  In essence, the 
market should be allowed to decide the fate of the CESL, rather than governmental or vested 
interests such as those of the legal professions.  Should it fail, then no-one would be 
damaged; success might on the other hand contribute to recovery in Europe, whether or not at 
the levels rather optimistically forecast by the European Commission.  A consultation paper 
agreed by the UK Government, the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Executive 
was published at the end of February 2012.   
This article nevertheless ends on an uncertain note, with awareness that there is 
sufficiently weighty opposition to the CESL proposal as to make its successful passage 
through the European legislative process a matter of some doubt.  Such a failure would be a 
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matter for regret.  The optional nature of the instrument if it comes into effect would be an 
interesting experiment with which to test the claim that the variety of domestic laws in the 
European Union is a barrier to the achievement of a single market.  The beauty of it would be 
that no-one is harmed if the experiment fails to attract takers, other perhaps than those who 
have wasted time, intellect and energy on what has always been a risky project.  But the 
benefits if Internet traders and SMEs in sufficient numbers did use it as a means to expand 
their markets more widely in Europe could be significant, and might well outweigh what in 
the great majority of cases would surely be a merely theoretical loss of consumer protection.  
There is much for which to play.   
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